https://www.opensourceway.blog/en/tags/kirin/Recent content in Kirin on The Way of Open SourceHugoenCopyright (c) 2016 - 2026, 「开源之道」·适兕; all rights reserved.Sat, 12 Sep 2026 01:36:45 +0800https://www.opensourceway.blog/en/posts/china-open-source-daily/2026/09/2026-09-12/Sat, 12 Sep 2026 01:36:45 +0800https://www.opensourceway.blog/en/posts/china-open-source-daily/2026/09/2026-09-12/"Four institutionally distinct movements on four different surfaces — one organizational (Huawei's open-source ecosystem lead Huang Zhipeng departs after 12 years with no named successor, on the same week Huawei's PyTorch Foundation Platinum entry is being formalized in a Western neutral foundation), one capital-market (DeepSeek engages CITIC Securities as STAR Market pre-IPO tutor, marking the formal institutional transition from private frontier AI lab to public-listed entity under Chinese capital-market regulation), one cross-border-capital (Moonshot AI considering dual Hong Kong + Shanghai STAR Market listings after a confidential Hong Kong IPO filing, with the SCMP explicitly noting that Hong Kong-listed AI stocks are underperforming and that the STAR Market's relaxed profitability requirements make it a natural second venue), one WeChat-monitor diagnostic (早安胡同's argument that 国产系统 should be framed as 'institutional products' rather than 'technical products', with a specific four-characteristics framework that reads 麒麟 / 统信 / 鸿蒙 as institutional-positioned operating systems, not just Linux derivatives). The four events together document a structurally new institutional pattern: on the Chinese open-source layer, the same week that Huawei's internal open-source leadership continuity is being questioned (Huang Zhipeng's departure) and DeepSeek's and Moonshot's capital-market formalization is being operationalized (STAR Market pre-IPO tutoring, dual-listing exploration), the WeChat-monitor surface explicitly formulates the domestic-OS question as an institutional-product question — the same question this series' August and September briefings have been documenting at different institutional surfaces, now operationalized at the WeChat-monitor-popular-commentary layer with a specific four-characteristics framework."https://www.opensourceway.blog/en/posts/china-open-source-daily/2026/09/2026-09-11/Fri, 11 Sep 2026 01:36:19 +0800https://www.opensourceway.blog/en/posts/china-open-source-daily/2026/09/2026-09-11/"Three institutional objects on three different surfaces — one ideological (Qiushi, the Party's theoretical flagship), one diagnostic (Zhishashe, an independent institutional-economics analysis piece), one competitive (a WeChat-monitor Xinchuang-industry half-year scorecard). First, Chen Kaihua's August 31 article in Qiushi (2026/17), a State Council-affiliated policy-researcher profiled as an invited professor at UCAS, formally places open source at the center of a national scientific-research reform agenda — for the first time, on a Chinese party-theoretical surface, listing 开源社区 (open-source community) alongside data platforms and AI research agents as a formal 科研主体 (research subject), and proposing 'a national-level open-source community for AI-driven research' with an explicit mechanism combining 'code contribution and compute incentive' (代码贡献与算力激励) — a structurally new institutional formulation on the same research-paradigm question that the September 9 briefing's CCTV codification first broadcast to a general audience. Second, Qinghe, editor-in-chief of Zhishashe (智本社), publishes a ~7000-word institutional-economics comparative analysis — '中国大厂：两边通吃' (Chinese Big Cos: Eats Both Sides) — comparing commercial-credit behavior across 5,382 A-share non-financial firms versus 1,523 U.S. non-financial firms, documenting a 5.33-trillion-yuan net payable-receivable surplus on the Chinese side (8.4% of revenue) against a 0.14-trillion-dollar net deficit on the U.S. side (−1.2% of revenue), and reading Chinese large manufacturers as institutional 'shadow banks' (影子银行) with interest-income-to-interest-expense coverage rising from 38% to 97% over 2017-2025 — an independent diagnostic that pairs directly with this series' August 26 Heilan 'going-global' institutional critique, applying the same institutional-economics frame to a different institutional surface (domestic commercial credit, not export). Third, Xinchuang-Lutoushe (信创露透社) publishes a September 1 half-year scorecard for 36 Xinchuang vendors across 8 segments — the sharpest institutional-economics finding being the divergence between the hardware layer (Cambricon 半年净赚23亿 turning profitable at 2.3B yuan, Muxi turning profitable at 0.6B yuan, Hygon at 9.1B revenue 12.16x the next-largest domestic-CPU rival) and the integration-vendor layer (Taiji dropping its profit 281x to a 350M yuan loss on a 72% market-cap decline from its April 2023 peak) — an institutional-form observation about where the domestic-substitution process is producing cash flow versus where it is producing debt and loss. One perspective, not a verdict."