China Open Source Daily — 2026-07-21

⚠️ China Open Source is not origin open source, it’s ‘State-Chartered Codebase’, ‘Intranet Shared Source’, ‘Cyber-Estate/Bonsai Source’. If you read the news/article, please use these to replace the words ‘Open Source’.

China Open Source Daily — 2026-07-21

🏛️ Policy & Regulation

1. NDRC Releases Eight-Point Action Plan for AI Cooperation and Development

On July 17, alongside the founding of WAICO, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) published the Action Plan for AI Cooperation and Development, an eight-point framework outlining China’s international AI cooperation strategy. The eight initiatives cover: high-quality data supply, inclusive access to AI computing power, open-source ecosystem sharing, deep AI enablement, joint cultivation of digital talent, joint development of rules and standards, collaboration on AI safety governance, and AI for Good.

According to the plan, China will deepen cooperation under the “AI Plus” initiative, establish international industrial cooperation platforms, support digital capacity building in developing countries, and promote the standardized application of AI agents. The plan explicitly names open-source ecosystem sharing as a core pillar of China’s AI cooperation strategy — signaling that open source is not merely a development methodology but a deliberate instrument of technology diplomacy.

Source: NDRC, Lexis China, Trivium China

2. Trivium Analysis: New Action Plan Details China’s Global South AI Push

The Trivium China research team published analysis on July 21 noting that the NDRC’s Action Plan is “unmistakably the new WAICO’s operational roadmap.” The plan does not explicitly name WAICO but provides the concrete policy mechanism for the governance body’s agenda. Trivium highlights that the plan’s emphasis on “open-source ecosystem sharing” and “inclusive access to AI computing power” positions China’s open-source AI ecosystem as a public good for the Global South — a framing that directly challenges Western narratives about China’s “technology sovereignty” ambitions.

Source: Trivium China

⚖️ Legal & Licensing

3. Mulan Public License v2 (Copyleft) Submitted to OSI for Review — Chinese Licensing Ecosystem Deepens

The Mulan Public License, Version 2 (Mulan PubL v2), a copyleft-style open-source license within the Mulan series, has been formally submitted to the Open Source Initiative (OSI) for approval. Submitted by Nadia representing KAIYUANSHE (开源社) as an OSI Affiliate Member, the license builds upon the Mulan Permissive Software License v2 (Mulan PSL v2) — which was OSI-approved in 2020 — by adding copyleft provisions that restrict distribution conditions for SaaS and other emerging technology deployment models.

This is a significant institutional development: the Mulan license family now spans permissive (Mulan PSL v2, OSI-approved), copyleft (Mulan PubL v2, under review), and loose (Mulan Loose License) variants — creating a complete Chinese-originated licensing ecosystem that mirrors the Western GPL/MIT/ Apache spectrum.

Institutional implications: The Mulan license family has been adopted by over 330,000 open-source projects domestically and has been donated to the OpenAtom Foundation. If Mulan PubL v2 gains OSI approval, China would have a complete set of OSI-recognized licenses — from permissive to strong copyleft — that are domestically governed, reducing dependence on Western license stewardship (FSF, Apache Software Foundation, etc.).

Source: OSI License Review Mailing List, Baidu Baike - Mulan License Family, Trivium China

🏗️ Institutional Change

4. Trump Administration Considers Ban on Chinese Open-Source AI Models

According to a July 20 Axios report, the Trump administration is showing signs it could ban cutting-edge Chinese AI models — a move that would have profound implications for the global open-source AI ecosystem. The report, citing knowledgeable sources, indicates that parts of the administration have previously tried to implement de facto bans on foreign open-source models, and the release of Moonshot AI’s Kimi K3 (2.8 trillion parameters, open-weight) has reignited those efforts.

The CryptoBriefing adds that the models under scrutiny include Kimi K3, which has “quietly become a go-to option for US developers and enterprises looking to cut costs.” The debate pits national security concerns against the practical reality that Chinese open-weight models are deeply embedded in the global AI development stack.

Institutional implications: A US ban on Chinese open-source AI models would represent a watershed moment in the great divergence of open-source governance. It would accelerate the bifurcation of the global AI ecosystem into two parallel tracks — one centered on Western models (OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta’s Llama) and one centered on Chinese models (DeepSeek, Qwen, Kimi) — with developers forced to choose sides. This is precisely the scenario that the “parallel infrastructure” dimension of the Great Divergence 2.0 framework predicts.

Source: Axios, CryptoBriefing, PoliticalWire

🔍 Cultural & Ideological Signals

5. Qiushi Publishes Essay on AI: “The Party Sketches Out Theory of Relationship Between Men and Machines”

On July 16, the Party’s top theoretical journal Qiushi (求是) ran an essay that appears to define the state’s ideological viewpoints on the proper relationship between humans and AI. As noted by Trivium China, the key message is that “AI is a tool that should serve human development.” This may seem like a standard formulation, but its publication in the Party’s highest theoretical organ at this specific moment — during WAIC 2026 and the founding of WAICO — signals that the leadership is actively constructing an ideological framework for AI governance.

Institutional implications: The Qiushi essay represents the “ideological layer” of China’s AI governance architecture. From a Douglass North institutional economics perspective, this is the construction of a shared mental model that legitimizes the formal rules (the NDRC Action Plan, AI Governance Code, etc.) and shapes how actors within the system interpret those rules. The essay’s framing of AI as a “tool” that must “serve the people” provides the ideological foundation for state-led AI development — distinguishing China’s approach from both the market-driven Western model and the purely techno-nationalist framing.

Source: Trivium China

🔍 WeChat Monitor (Institutional Signals)

Chinese open source organizations communicate extensively through WeChat Official Accounts. This section tracks signals from these platforms that are often invisible to the global open source community.

OpenAtom Foundation — The foundation’s WeChat account has been promoting the OpenAtom 2026 Open Source Ecosystem Conference outcomes, highlighting the Mulan license donation announcement and new projects under incubation. Sparse activity in the post-conference period.

木兰开源社区 (Mulan Open Source Community) — Active promotion of the Mulan PubL v2 submission to OSI, with community calls for feedback on the copyleft provisions. The community’s role as the steward of the Mulan license family is becoming increasingly institutionalized.

信通院 可信开源 (CAICT Trusted Open Source) — The CAICT (China Academy of Information and Communications Technology) has been publishing analysis of the NDRC Action Plan’s implications for enterprise open source adoption, particularly the “open-source ecosystem sharing” pillar and its implications for OSPO frameworks.

🔍 Commentary

The Week After: Institutional Aftermath of WAIC 2026

The week following WAIC 2026 has revealed the institutional scaffolding behind the spectacle. Three developments — the NDRC Action Plan, the Qiushi essay, and the Mulan PubL v2 OSI submission — form a coherent pattern when viewed together:

The key insight from the Great Divergence 2.0 framework: China is not just “participating” in open source — it is systematically constructing a complete institutional stack for open source governance. Each element — ideological (Qiushi), legal (Mulan), operational (NDRC Plan), and organizational (OpenAtom) — mirrors a corresponding element in the Western open-source institutional ecosystem but is governed by Chinese state-backed institutions rather than Western civil society.

The Trump administration’s potential ban on Chinese open-source models adds a geopolitical accelerator to this divergence. If the US blocks Chinese open-weight models, it will force developers to choose ecosystems — and that choice may be the event that crystallizes the parallel open-source worlds that the divergence framework has long predicted.

📊 Trends

1. License Ecosystem Maturation — The Mulan license family’s evolution from permissive (2020 OSI approval) to copyleft (PubL v2 under review) mirrors the historical maturation of Western open-source licensing. China is now building a complete licensing infrastructure, reducing dependence on Western license stewardship.

2. Open Source as AI Diplomacy Instrument — The NDRC Action Plan’s explicit inclusion of “open-source ecosystem sharing” as a pillar of international AI cooperation signals that open source is being deployed as a tool of technology diplomacy, particularly toward the Global South.

3. Ideological Construction of AI Governance — The Qiushi essay represents a new phenomenon: the Chinese Communist Party’s theoretical journal is now actively shaping the ideological framework for AI and open source. This is unprecedented in the open-source world, where ideological work has traditionally been done by civil society (FSF, OSI, Creative Commons) rather than by state organs.

4. Geopolitical Bifurcation Accelerating — The convergence of Chinese institutional construction (Mulan, OpenAtom, NDRC Plan) and Western restriction impulses (potential US ban) is creating a self-reinforcing cycle of divergence. Each side’s actions legitimize the other’s — China builds parallel institutions because it expects exclusion, and the West imposes restrictions because it sees parallel institutions as a threat.